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J. H. ZUMNALEN TyRzELL WiLuAms
NOTES
RIGHT OF PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS TO
SERVE THEMSELVES
The right of public service corporations to serve themselves is one
branch of the question: Under what circumstances and to what extent
should corporations be allowed to engage in activities outside the scope
of the main business that they were created to carry on? The decision
of this question depends upon a consideration of the interests of three
classes of persons: First, the stockholders. Their interests do not
fall within the purview of this discussion. Second, and more impor-
tant than the first class, that part of the public that makes use of the
services of the public utility. For instance, in the railroad-coal cases,
the independent shippers of coal; or in the grain warehouse case, the
independent owners of grain wishing to warehouse their grain. Third,
and most important, the public as consumers of the article in question.
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The lengthy argument and array of statistics produced in the trial of
the cases to prove the existence or danger of monopoly and conse-
quent fixing of prices, are directed to the protection of this vast con-
suming public.
There has been a good deal of legislation, on the part of the
States, to prevent this kind of monopoly, either in the form of con-
stitutional or statutory prohibitions of ultra iires activities, or by
directly forbidding railroad companies to engage in mining, manu-
facturing, etc. These efforts have generally been abortive. They
have had to face a legal situation, for many railroads had charters
enabling them to hold and operate mines, and many owned large tracts
of land given by the government. These efforts were also in conflict
with a more powerful economic principle, the need to develop the.
resources of the country. In a countr " richer in natural resources
than in capital or labor it seemed expedient to legislators, and doubt-
less to the consuming public itself, to foster rapid development rather
than to shackle production by safeguards against monopoly. To illus-
trate this conflict and to explain the embarrassment of Congress when
it was drafting the Commodities Clause, and of the courts in inter-
preting it, I shall quote from several State statutes. Pennsylvania,
"It shall and may be lawful for railroad and canal companies to aid
corporations authorized by law to develop the coal, iron, lumber and
other material interests of this commonwealth by the purchase of their
capital stock and bonds, or either of them, or by the guaranty of or
agreement to purchase the principal and interest, or either, of such
bonds," except in Schuylkill County. Washington, "It shall be law-
ful for any railway within the State or which may own, lease or oper-
ate in diI future any such line or lines of railway within this State, to
take, acquire, own, negotiate, sell and guarantee bonds and stocks of
companies or corporations which are or may hereafter be organized
for the purpose of irrigating and reclaiming arid lands contiguous
or tributary to such line or lines oi railway." Also, the railway may
itself build and own and operate irrigation ditches. Therefore, when
the Constitution of Pennsylvania, effective January, 1874, forbade a
railroad to engage in mining or manufacturing articles for transporta-
tion of its lines, or to engage, directly or indirectly, in any other busi-
ness than that of common carrier, naturally the courts of Pennsylva-
nia construed this clause as applying only to future conditions, and,
even so interpreted, did not rigidy enforce it; especially since there
was no provision prohibiting control through stock ownership or sub-
sidiary companies. Also, naturally, the Interstate Commerce Coin-
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mission recognized the railways involved as "possessing the com-
mingled attributes of carrier and producer."'
In the midst of this general situation two. pieces of legislation
against a public service corporation's serving itself have been en-
forced in the courts, with the result, probably, of a mere legal change,
but no material economic alterations. The clause of the Illinois Con-
stitution that declares grain warehouses of a certain description "pub-
lic" is held to forbid the warehouse corporation, or stockholders, to
mingle their grain with the grain of the patrons.2 This is the only
case in which the decision is based upon common law principles. The
court held that the word "public" in this clause of the Constitution
imposed upon the corporation and the individual stockholders the duty
of acting in the interest of the whole public and of their patrons; of
refraining from assuming any position that would expose them to the
temptation of unfair dealing and manipulation of the market. It was
claimed that the relation of a public service corporation to the public
was similar to that of a trustee, and all the cases cited were trustee
cases, except one that treated of the duty of an administrator; thus
making use of the common law, not in the narrow sense, but in the
broad sense, as including equity. Common law principles are referred
to at length in many decisions, but such references are mere dicta,
as the decisions are based upon the statute in question. For exam-
ple, in New Haveh R. v. Inter. Com. Coni., " before the passage of the
Commodities Clause, the court said: "'\Ve shall not direct our atten-
tion to expressly determining whether the assertion by a carrier of
a right to deal in the products which it transports would not be so
repugnant to the general duty resting on the carrier as to cause the
exertion of the power to deal in the products which it transports to
be unlawful, irrespective of statutory rsetrictions"; but the decision
is based on the federal statute forbidding rate discrimination. Very
similar to the language used in the Illinois case are dicta in State v.
Stand. Oil Co.," and other cases arising under various anti-monopoly
statutes. Compare summary of corporate actions condemned by the
courts in H. 0. Taylor's Private Corporations, under the headings
Ultra I'ires and Monopoly, especially sections 306, 307, 309, fifth edi-
tion. So in Atty.-Gen'l v. The Gt. N. R. Co.,- the Vice-Chancellor
1. D. L. & W. v. Haddock, 3 I. C. R. 302 (1890); Leh. V. R. R. v. Coxe.
3 1. C. R. 460 (1891).
2. Hannah v. The People, 198 I11. 77 (1902).
3. 200 U. S. 361 (1905).
4. 49 Ohio St. 137.
5. 29 Law Journal (N. S. Equity) 794.
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said: "'It is greatly against public interest that railways become mer-
chants of the commodities they haul: the danger of monopoly is great."
But he decided the case on the ground that dealing in coal was 0Itra
tires, saying, -The law is in the act of parliament creating the joint-
stock company." This case settled the matter for England. As her
legislators and judges were not hampered by the legal and economic
situation shown above in existence here, the question was the simple
one of ultra s'ires.
The other piece of legislation is the Commodities Clause of the
Hepburn Act. a revision of the Interstate Commerce Act made by
Congress in 1906. By this clause interstate railroads are forbidden
to transport commodities (other than lumber) owned or produced
by themselves, except such as are for their own use. The word "pro-
duced" has been practically eliminated by judicial interpretation. Also,
it is held that railroads have not been foridden to own, by their stock-
holders individually or in their corporate capacity, some or all of the
stock in corporations manufacturing or marketing their commodites.'
The latter point is supported by the discussion of the bill before its
passage; for in the Senate, where the clause originated, amendments
were rejected that forbade the transportation of commodities pro-
duced or owned by a corporation in which the railroad owned stock.
In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan said that the statute
meant to forbid a railroad's holding stock in manufacturing, etc.,
companies. "'Any other view of the act will enable the transporting
railroad company, by one device or another, to defeat altogether the
purpose which Congress had in view, which was to divorce, in a real,
substantial sense, production and transportation, and thereby to pre-
vent the transporting company from doing injustice to other owners
of coal." We may compare what the Chesapeake and Ohio actually
did in West Virginia after the passage of the State statute forbidding
a railroad company to buy and sell coal: it bought in the name of an-
other.- This case against the Delaware and Hudson R. R., together
with cases against several other roads, was brought in a Federal cir-
cuit court. There the Commodities Clause was declared unconstitu-
tional. It was carried to the Supreme Court, where the clause was
held constitutional with the above interpretation, and all the cases
sent back to the fircuit Court. Next we have the case of U. S. v.
Lehigh Valley R. R. Co.,' decided in Federal District Court for de-
6. See U. S. v. Del. 8- H. R. Co., 213 U. S. 366 (May 3, 1909).
7. See New Haven R. v. Inter. Com. Com., 200 U. S. 361 (1905), referred
to above.
8. 220 U. S. 257 (1910).
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fendant. On appeal to Supreme Court, it was held that a railroad is
forbidden to do by indirection what it may not do directly. Case re-
manded to be tried on the facts as to whether the railroad company
was using the Lehigh Valley Coal Company as its tool to monopolize
the coal of a certain area, and to control prices both in the coal district
and at the seaboard. It was tried before the District Court and de-
cided for the defendant.
At last we have a conviction under the clause, U. S. v. Del., Lack.
& W. R.' The court aiserts as governing principle, "The Commodity
Clause of the Hepburn Act was intended to prevent railroads from
occupying the dual and inconsistent positions of public carrier and
private shipper." Decided, that the contract between this railroad
and a coal company of the same name, organized by the railroad com-
pany after the passage of the Commodity Clause, is void because it
violates the Commodity Clause, since the coal company is really made
the agent of the railroad company, and because it violates the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act, since it is in restraint of trade. Also in Del., Lack.
& W. R. v. U. S.,10 it was held unlawful for a railroad to transport
hay to feed the animals used in its coal mines, for 759 of the output
of the coal mines was for sale; hence the hay was not for the railroad
in its business as a carrier.
There is an interesting monograph, published in 1916, on "The
Commodities Clause," by Thomas L. Kibler, professor of economics,
A. & M. College, Texas. I have drawn largely upon its facts, but
differ radically from its conclusions: it condemns monopolies. I should
foster them and regulate them to cheapen commodities for the public.
Also, Professor Kibler, as it seems to me, does not recognize the force
of the difficulties and complications arising from our legal and eco-
nomic situation as suggested at the beginning of this article.
MRS. ANNA BATES HERS.MAX.
9. 238 U. S. 516 (June 21, 1915).
10. 231 U. S. 363 (1913).
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